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Criminal Courts and tribunals
InternatIonal CrImInal Court
Fourth State Party to the rome 
Statute ratIFIeS CrIme  
oF aggreSSIon amendment
luxembourg recently became the fourth 
state Party of the international Criminal 
Court (iCC, Court) to ratify amendments 
to the rome statute that were adopted in 
a historic consensus at the 2010 review 
Conference of the international Criminal 
Court in Kampala, uganda. the January 
15, 2013 ratification brings the contro-
versial amendments another step closer to 
entering into force. if the requisite number 
of states ratify the proposed amendments, 
the iCC’s jurisdiction would dramatically 
increase in scope, likely having profound 
global implications for current armed 
conflicts.
although the rome statute included 
the crime of aggression within the Court’s 
jurisdiction at its inception, the Court has 
been unable to exercise its jurisdiction 
as the original statute failed to define 
the crime or its jurisdictional boundaries. 
the inclusion of the crime of aggression 
in article 5, while lacking a functional 
definition and jurisdictional details, was 
part of a compromise reached during the 
negotiation of the rome statute in 1998. 
However, on June 11, 2010, the delegates 
of the review Conference of the rome 
statute adopted amendments that included 
a definition of the crime of aggression 
and established conditions for the Court’s 
jurisdiction.
the amendments adopted in Kampala 
include article 8 which defines the crime 
of aggression for the purpose of the rome 
statute. the text of article 8(1) states that 
the crime of aggression must be conducted 
by a person effectively controlling the 
political or military action of a state and 
is “the planning, preparation, initiation 
or execution […] of an act of aggression 
which, by its character, gravity and scale, 
constitutes a manifest violation of the 
Charter of the united nations.” the term 
“act of aggression” is defined in article 
8(2) bis as the “use of armed force by a 
state against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political independence of 
another state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Charter of the united 
nations.” notably, this definition refers 
back to the un Charter throughout the 
text, reflecting compromises made to limit 
the scope of the definition.
the adopted amendments also include 
article 15 bis and 15 ter, the conditions for 
the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the 
crime of aggression. according to article 
15 bis, for the crime of aggression, the 
prosecutor could only open an investigation 
proprio motu or one based on a state 
referral of a situation, after ascertaining 
whether the un security Council has made 
a determination of an act of aggression 
committed by the state concerned. if the 
security Council has made such a deter-
mination, then the prosecutor may initiate 
the investigation. if the security Council 
has not made such a determination within 
six months of the date of notification, 
then the prosecutor may commence the 
investigation only if the Pre-trial Chamber 
has authorized it and the security Council 
has not decided against recognition of an 
act of aggression.
the idea of a crime of aggression, 
while treated as a novel idea by many 
states Parties to the rome statute, is not 
at all a new concept within international 
law. article 1 of the 1928 Kellogg-briand 
Pact, known as the General treaty for 
the renunciation of War, declared, “the 
High Contracting Parties solemnly declare 
in the names of their respective peoples 
that they condemn recourse to war for 
the solution of international controversies, 
and renounce it, as an instrument of 
national policy in their relations with one 
another.” With the commencement of the 
nuremburg tribunal in 1950, an interna-
tional court actually applied its jurisdiction 
to the crime of aggression though it used the 
term “crimes against peace.” the definition 
of crimes against peace adopted in 
the nuremburg principles comprises 
“planning, preparation, initiation or waging 
of a war of aggression or a war in violation 
of international treaties, agreements or 
assurances.”
along with the ideas promulgated 
at nuremburg, the un Charter, adopted 
in 1945, prohibited the use of armed 
force against another state in article 2(4). 
although international law had customarily 
protected the sovereignty of states, including 
their right to use armed force against another, 
the un Charter, along with nuremburg, 
suggest an evolving intent to limit the 
legitimate use of armed forces to situations 
of self-defense, although international 
humanitarian law has yet to place such 
strict limits in all cases. the new amend-
ments to the rome statue would take steps 
toward reinforcing these limitations on the 
use of armed force and can be seen as an 
attempt to further the principles endorsed 
by nuremburg—the end to global conflicts 
that result in mass casualties and the ability 
to hold individuals accountable for their 
actions in these atrocities.
ICC WIthdraWS ChargeS agaInSt 
Former Kenyan oFFICIal
the international Criminal Court’s 
(iCC) Prosecutor, Fatou bensouda, filed a 
motion in march 2013 to drop all charges 
against Francis Kirimi muthaura, the former 
Head of the Public service and secretary 
to the Cabinet of the republic of Kenya, 
a co-accused of Kenya’s recently elected 
President, uhuru Kenyatta. muthaura and 
Kenyatta were jointly accused of five 
counts of crimes against humanity for 
their alleged involvement in authorizing 
and organizing the wave of violence that 
swept through Kenya following contested 
presidential elections in late 2007. all 
five counts are included in article 7(1) 
of the rome statute of the iCC, which 
defines crimes against humanity as certain 
acts “committed as part of a widespread 
or systematic attack directed against any 
civilian population, with knowledge of 
the attack.” specifically, muthaura and 
Kenyatta were charged with murder, 
deportation or forcible transfer, rape, 
persecution, and other inhumane acts 
resulting in the death of more than 1,000 
civilians and the displacement of more 
than 600,000 more. in bensouda’s state-
ment on the notice to withdraw charges 
against muthaura, she stressed that it was 
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her duty to do so when there is no longer 
a reasonable prospect of conviction at trial.
In the wake of the worst unrest in 
Kenya since its independence in 1963, 
Muthaura has been accused of authorizing 
police to use excessive force against pro-
testers, protected members of the Party of 
National Unity’s youth militia, and also 
of attending meetings in which attacks 
on civilians were planned. On March 31, 
2010, the Pre-Trial Chamber II granted the 
prosecution’s request to initiate an investi-
gation into crimes of humanity committed 
by Muthaura and Kenyatta. Subsequently, 
the case was referred to Trial Chamber V 
on March 29, 2012. Under Article 61(9) 
of the Rome Statute, “after commence-
ment of the trial, the Prosecutor may, 
with the permission of the Trial Chamber, 
withdraw the charges” against the accused. 
There is no further guidance within the 
Statute itself on what conditions must 
be met for the withdrawal of charges or 
how charges are withdrawn procedurally. 
On March 11, 2013, Bensouda issued 
a statement on her notice to withdraw 
charges against Muthaura, in which she 
cited several reasons for the withdrawal, 
including witnesses’ death or refusal to 
testify due to fear, the lack of support from 
the government of Kenya in providing 
critical evidence and facilitating access 
to witnesses, and most importantly the 
fact that the key witness—witness number 
four—recanted a crucial part of his state-
ment and admitted to accepting bribes.
Bensouda stressed that this decision 
has no bearing on the charges against 
President-elect Kenyatta, and stated: “My 
decision today is based on the specific 
facts of the case against Mr. Muthaura, 
and not on any other consideration. While 
we are all aware of political develop-
ments in Kenya, these have no influence, 
at all, on the decisions I make as the 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Court.” However, at the hearing in which 
Trial Chamber V officially dropped the 
charges against Muthaura, Kenyatta’s 
lawyers urged the Chamber to drop the 
charges of crimes against humanity against 
their client, claiming the charges were 
based on hearsay and were fundamentally 
flawed. According to Article 27 of the 
Rome Statute, should Kenyatta take office 
while there are still charges against him at 
the ICC, he will not receive any type of 
head of state immunity. Kenyatta’s lawyers 
have argued that the entire case should be 
returned to the Pre-Trial Chamber because 
the prosecution’s case has changed drasti-
cally in the past year as certain evidence 
no longer exists and a high percentage of 
new evidence and undisclosed witnesses 
have been offered. Lawyers representing 
victims of the violence fear that if Kenyatta 
does take power, there could be wide-
spread retaliation for cooperating with 
the prosecution and serious danger for 
witnesses against him.
The democratic election of an alleged 
criminal accused of grave human rights 
abuses presents a seemingly monumental 
problem for the International Criminal 
Court, which has had a shaky history since 
its inception ten years ago. Many have 
criticized the Court as being too African-
focused, not effective enough, and an 
enduring symbol of western colonialism 
—criticisms Kenyatta capitalized on in 
the election by using his indictment as 
a way to gather popular support. The 
decision of the Prosecutor to withdraw the 
charges against Muthaura due to lack of 
evidence could be seen as an example of 
the inefficiencies of the Court. However it 
could also serve as an important reminder 
about the rule of law and the protections of 
defendant’s rights that are essential to any 
fair justice system.
Tracy French, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 




WItness IdentIty leaks In the 
speCIal trIbunal for lebanon 
lead to InvestIgatIon and possIble 
Contempt Charges 
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
(STL) came under political scrutiny in 
January for leaking the identities of wit-
nesses in the upcoming trials surrounding 
the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese 
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. The source of 
the leak is unknown, although the names, 
photographs, and identifying information 
of the witnesses were published in the 
local Al Akhbar newspaper, known for 
being aligned with the Hezbollah move-
ment in Lebanon. The STL quickly issued 
a statement in which it “denounce[d] in 
the strongest possible terms any attempts 
at witness intimidation.” Al Akhbar, in an 
article titled The STL Witness List: Why 
We Published, justified the release of the 
names and photographs, saying that the 
public has a right to know the identities 
of those testifying against the accused. 
Concerns about witness intimidation fur-
ther complicate public opinion regarding 
the already-controversial trial, which will 
try the four accused in abstentia.
In April 2013, the Pre-Trial Judge 
determined that these leaks likely con-
stituted contempt of court and asked the 
President of the tribunal to refer the matter 
to a Contempt Judge. In accordance with 
a March 2013 calendar assigning one 
Contempt Judge and one Appeals Panel 
for each month of the year, the President 
of the STL, Judge David Baragwanath, 
was designated as the Contempt Judge 
in this matter. After the April 25, 2013, 
hearing on the contempt allegations, Judge 
Baragwanath issued a decision ordering 
the appointment of an independent amicus 
curiae to investigate the source of the leaks 
and those who published the confidential 
information. Rule 60 bis allows the STL 
to hold individuals found in contempt of 
court, meaning those who “knowingly and 
willingly interfere with its administration 
of justice” or “those who threaten and 
intimidate witnesses,” responsible through 
sentences up to seven years in prison and 
fines up to 100,000 Euros.
Other international criminal tribu-
nals have suffered similar challenges 
to the proper administration of justice. 
Most notably, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
faced comparable issues involving leaks 
and publication of witness names and iden-
tifying information. In the Celebici case, 
tried in 1997, the tribunal was adjourned 
for over a week while the Office of the 
Prosecutor investigated leaks. Although 
the prosecutor identified members of the 
defense counsel as the sources of the leak 
to the publication Sloboda Herzegovina, 
the President of the Tribunal, Judge 
Antonio Cassese, concluded that there 
was not enough evidence to hold defense 
attorneys in contempt of court. However, 
Judge Cassese noted that the defendant, 
Zejnil Delalic, may have spoken to the 
press himself and, in doing so, may have 
been in contempt of court. The tribunal 
accepted Judge Cassese’s findings regard-
ing the defense counselors but rejected 
the implication that Delalic should be 
investigated for contempt of court. In 
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2012, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY 
affirmed former Serbian leader Vojislav 
Seselj’s sentence of eighteen months in 
jail for publishing the names of protected 
who testified in his trial before the ICTY. 
The defendant disclosed the names and 
pseudonyms of witnesses on his website 
and in his 2007 book. The Contempt Trial 
Chamber found Seselj guilty of contempt 
of court in October 2011 and ordered that 
the defendant remove the names and the 
book from his website. 
Witness testimony before international 
criminal tribunals in cases of war crimes 
and crimes against humanity is essential to 
the pursuit of the truth and the administra-
tion of justice, but it can also be dangerous 
and difficult. The individuals on trial may 
be politically or militarily powerful, and 
witnesses risk being identified when they 
agree to testify before an international 
tribunal. For this reason, the STL’s Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence strictly out-
line witness protection procedures, which 
become effective as soon as individuals 
enter their applications to become wit-
nesses. From this moment onward, the 
tribunal incurs a duty to “ensure security, 
safety and protection of victims and wit-
nesses, as well as to respect their con-
fidentiality” and the tribunal becomes 
responsible for implementing “protective 
measures to ensure witnesses are able 
to testify in court without fears about 
their safety, security, and confidentiality.” 
Rule 133 of STL’s Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence outlines steps to guard the 
identity of the witnesses, including the use 
of pseudonyms in written accounts of the 
trial, facial distortion in public broadcast 
of the proceedings, and voice distortion 
in public broadcast. To limit the expo-
sure during the trial, the proceedings are 
generally closed to the public during the 
presentation of evidence, and witnesses are 
permitted to give testimony via video link 
instead of being present in the courtroom. 
In an effort to decrease the opportunity 
for disclosure, identifying information is 
expunged from the public record, includ-
ing the court transcript, and the chamber 
may limit the time each party has access 
to the identities of the witnesses of the 
opposing party. If counsel for either side 
feels that the witness is at imminent risk 
of death or serious harm, he or she may 
apply to the registrar for entry of the wit-
ness into the tribunal’s protection program, 
under which the individual would then be 
relocated. Failures to respect or protect 
confidentiality may result in contempt of 
court, which potentially includes jail time.
Although the trial was set to begin at 
the end of March, the STL indicated that 
these leaks along with delays in disclosure 
of evidence, required the tribunal to post-
pone the hearing, and the case is still in the 
pre-trial phase.
French court Invokes  
unIversal JurIsdIctIon  
In rwandan GenocIde case
In early April 2013, French prosecutors 
announced the domestic trial of a former 
captain in the Rwandan army for his 
alleged involvement in the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide. Citing universal jurisdiction, 
prosecutors charged Pascal Simbikangwa, 
who was arrested in 2008 by French 
officials under an international arrest 
warrant, with the crimes of “complicity 
in genocide” and “complicity in crimes 
against humanity.” This trial marks the 
first attempt by the French government to 
prosecute anyone in connection with the 
Rwandan genocide. The trial order is a 
response to a complaint filed by a group 
formed by Rwandans living in France 
called the Collective of Civil Plaintiffs 
for Rwanda (CPCR). Simbikangwa was 
a captain and intelligence officer with the 
Rwandan military under the former Hutu 
president Juvenal Habyarimana, whose 
assassination triggered the mass atrocities 
throughout the nation. French prosecutors 
accuse Simbikangwa of being a member 
of Akazu, a Hutu group of extremists 
believed to have planned and executed the 
genocide. Simbikangwa is also accused of 
arming the Interahamwe Hutu militia and 
facilitating the massacre of Tutsis.
Universal jurisdiction, the doctrine 
under which certain crimes can be adju-
dicated in states in which the alleged 
crime was not committed, usually only 
applies if the judicial system that would 
have jurisdiction is unable or unwilling 
to conduct a fair and independent trial. 
While this was the scenario that led to the 
creation of the ICTR, with the tribunal’s 
mandate coming to an end and the transfer 
of cases to Rwandan domestic courts, this 
is no longer the case.
France has repeatedly refused to extra-
dite genocide suspects to Rwanda based on 
the belief that detainees would not receive 
a fair trial. However, instead of referring 
cases directly to the International Criminal 
Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR), in 2010 
France created a unit of its Prosecutor-
General’s Office tasked with investigating 
suspects’ involvement in the genocide for 
proceedings within the French judicial sys-
tem. Even after the official transfer of the 
ICTR’s cases to Rwanda’s domestic courts, 
France officially indicted Simbikangwa in 
its own courts. Simbikangwa’s attorneys 
have not yet responded to the French 
trial order, and it is unclear whether they 
will attempt to appeal the decision and 
challenge France’s jurisdiction.
Although the application of universal 
jurisdiction to prosecute genocide sus-
pects in domestic courts is not common, 
similar indictments have been issued in 
the past, leading to successful—though 
controversial—trials, such as those con-
ducted in Belgium in 2001. The Belgium 
trial marked the first time that a jury was 
asked to make a determination of guilt for 
violations of international humanitarian 
law in another country. However, France’s 
choice to try a Rwandan genocide sus-
pect in its domestic courts is particularly 
unusual in 2013 because experts within 
the ICTR and the United Nations have 
determined Rwanda’s domestic courts to 
be capable of providing fair and inde-
pendent hearings for genocide suspects. 
The ICTR also transferred its documents 
and mandate to an intermediate court 
called the Mechanism for International 
Criminal Tribunals (MICT). The MICT is 
responsible for concluding the remaining 
cases open regarding crimes committed in 
Rwanda and in the former Yugoslavia. In 
November 2012, Emmanuelle Ducos, the 
vice president of the French tribunal deal-
ing with Simbikangwa, formally requested 
access to all confidential materials the 
ICTR, and now the MICT, possess con-
cerning the suspect. The MICT prosecutor 
did not object to the request and the judge, 
in a ruling on December 20, 2012, permit-
ted the French tribunal access to some 
documents while requiring witness consent 
to release others. According to this ruling, 
Simbikangwa’s case is no longer pending 
before the ICTR or the MICT, meaning 
that it is among the cases transferred to 
Rwandan domestic courts for prosecution.
France’s decision to issue the trial order 
was welcomed by Rwandan advocacy 
groups; however, it also triggered calls 
for further commitment to prosecution. 
Jean de Dieu Mucyo, executive secretary 
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of the National Commission Against the 
Genocide, pointed to France’s refusal to 
arrest and prosecute other genocide sus-
pects in the state. In particular, Rwandan 
groups have tried to put pressure on 
France to arrest and prosecute Agathe 
Habyarimana, the wife of former Rwandan 
president Juvenal Habyarimana. She is 
believed to have chaired the Akazu and 
used her economic and political influ-
ence to encourage the killing of Tutsis. 
Last year, France granted her permanent 
residency. As Simbikangwa’s trial moves 
forward, Rwandan anti-genocide organiza-
tions, as well as Rwandan citizens through-
out Europe, will assess this prosecution’s 
implications for the future relationship 
between France and Rwanda as well as 
the success of any potential proceedings 
against Simbikangwa in Rwandan domes-
tic courts.
Megan Wakefield, a J.D. candidate 
at the American University Washington 
College of Law, is a staff writer for the 
Human Rights Brief.
Judgment SummarieS: 
international Criminal  
tribunal for rwanda
gaSpard KanyaruKiga v. the 
proSeCutor, appealS Judgment, 
CaSe no. iCtr 02-78-a
On May 8, 2012, the Appeals 
Chamber for the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) affirmed 
Trial Chamber II’s conviction of Gaspard 
Kanyarukiga for planning genocide and 
extermination as a crime against humanity 
based on his role in the destruction of 
the Nyange church on April 16, 1994, 
which resulted in the deaths of approxi-
mately 2,000 Tutsi civilians. The Appeals 
Chamber also affirmed his thirty-year 
sentence of imprisonment.
Notably, Kanyarukiga asserted a total 
of 72 grounds of appeal. Challenges were 
grouped into four categories: alleged 
violations of Kanyarukiga’s fair trial 
rights, alleged errors relating to the 
indictment, alleged errors related to 
the rejection of the accused’s alibi, and 
claims that the Trial Chamber engaged 
in faulty assessments of the evidence. 
With regard to the challenges based on 
alleged violations of the accused’s fair 
trial rights, Kanyarukiga claimed, inter 
alia, that the Trial Chamber improp-
erly denied his request for a stay of 
proceedings, which had been based on 
the argument that three laissez-passers 
seized from the accused at the time of his 
arrest had disappeared, making it impos-
sible for the accused to establish his 
alibi defense. In response, the Appeals 
Chamber noted that the Trial Chamber 
was not convinced that the evidence had 
in fact been seized from the accused 
and that, in any event, the accused could 
establish his alibi defense through other 
evidence, meaning that there was no 
abuse of process such that proceeding 
with the trial would “contravene the 
court’s sense of justice, due to pre-trial 
impropriety or misconduct.” The Appeals 
Chamber agreed, concluding that the 
lower court had not abused its discretion 
by not ordering the requested stay and 
noting that the burden was on the defense 
to show that the accused had suffered an 
abuse of process that damaged his fair 
trial rights. The Appeals Chamber simi-
larly rejected claims from the defense 
that his fair trial rights were damaged 
by the Trial Chamber’s alleged setting 
of arbitrary time limits on the defense’s 
cross-examinations or by the failure to 
issue timely rulings on challenges to the 
admissibility of prosecution evidence. 
Again, the Appeals Chamber found that 
these grounds were insufficient because 
the defense failed to show that the Trial 
Chamber erred in exercising its discre-
tion and that the defense was prejudiced 
as a result.
Concerning the alleged errors relating 
to the indictment, the Appeals Chamber 
dismissed all but one of the defense’s 
challenges. Specifically, the Appeals 
Chamber upheld Kanyarukiga’s claim that 
the prosecution erred by failing to allege 
in the indictment that Kanyarukiga had 
engaged in a conversation with another 
ICTR accused, Clément Kayishema, 
concerning the destruction of the Nyange 
church. According to the Appeals 
Chamber, this conversation constituted 
a material fact that, along with others, 
underpinned Kanyarukiga’s conviction 
for planning genocide and extermination. 
The Appeals Chamber then recalled that 
the prosecution is required to identify 
in the indictment the “particular acts” 
or the “particular course of conduct” 
on the part of the accused that formed 
the basis for the charge in question. The 
absence of this information rendered the 
indictment faulty. However, the Appeals 
Chamber concluded that, because the 
prosecution did properly include in the 
indictment allegations relating to another 
“planning” conversation that took place 
the following day, there was sufficient 
basis for the Trial Chamber’s holding that 
Kanyarukiga was responsible for plan-
ning the destruction of the church. Thus, 
the lower court’s judgment was affirmed.
The defense’s challenges based 
on alleged alibi error failed due to 
the broad discretion afforded to the 
Trial Chamber in evaluating factual 
information presented at trial, with the 
Appeals Chamber stressing that a “Trial 
Chamber need not explain every step 
of its reasoning.” Lastly, the Appeals 
Chamber dismissed the allegations that 
the Trial Chamber improperly evaluated 
the evidence, a claim that largely rested 
on challenges to the lower court’s deci-
sions regarding witness credibility and 
treatment of corroborating statements. 
On this subject, the Appeals Chamber 
stressed that that the Trial Chamber is best 
placed to observe a witness’s demeanor 
during testimony and to resolve any 
inconsistencies that may arise within 
or amongst witnesses’ testimonies, par-
ticularly given that the Trial Chamber 
can consider whether the evidence taken 
as a whole is reliable and credible. The 
Appeals Chamber further held that the 
testimony of two witnesses may be found 
to corroborate one another if the two 
testimonies are “compatible” regarding 
a fact or sequence of facts, and that it 
is not necessary that the testimonies be 
identical in all aspects.
In addition to rejecting the vast 
majority of the defense’s various 
grounds of appeal, the Appeals Chamber 
rejected the prosecution’s appeal that 
the Trial Chamber erred in failing to 
sentence the accused to life in prison. 
The Appeals Chamber found that a 
“sentence of [thirty] years’ imprison-
ment may be considered among the most 
severe sentences,” and that it was not 
“so unreasonable or plainly unjust” to 
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require the Appeals Chamber’s interven-
tion. The prosecution also appealed the 
Trial Chamber’s finding that the evidence 
proving that Kanyarukiga planned the 
destruction of the Nyange church was 
insufficient to establish that he “signifi-
cantly contributed” to the destruction of 
the church, which led the Trial Chamber 
to conclude that it could not convict 
the accused for participating in a joint 
criminal enterprise aimed at destroying 
the church. The majority of the Appeals 
Chamber declined to rule on this ground 
of appeal, noting that the prosecution did 
not seek to invalidate the lower court’s 
verdict but simply sought “clarification 
on an issue of general importance to 
the development of the Tribunal’s case 
law.” However, Judge Pocar did write 
a Separate Opinion, offering the clari-
fication sought by the prosecution. He 
noted that the Appeals Chamber has the 
discretion to “hear appeals where a party 
has raised a legal issue that would not 
invalidate the judgment,” and explained 
that “the clarification of [the] issue will 
avoid uncertainty and confusion in future 
cases.” Judge Pocar began his Separate 
Opinion by recalling that all three catego-
ries of joint criminal-enterprise liability 
share the following constitutive elements: 
(i) a plurality of persons; (ii) the existence 
of a common plan, design or purpose that 
amounts to or involves the commission 
of a crime provided for in the ICTR 
Statute; and (iii) the participation of the 
accused in the common purpose. He then 
explained that the last element, participa-
tion, does not require the commission “of 
a specific crime” but rather “may take the 
form of assistance in, or contribution to, 
the execution of the common purpose.” 
In this case, as Judge Pocar recalled, 
the Trial Chamber determined that “the 
requisite contribution would have been 
met if Kanyarukiga had ‘ordered, insti-
gated, encouraged or provided material 
assistance to the attackers’” at the church, 
but that his role in planning the attack was 
insufficient. Judge Pocar disagreed with 
this conclusion, noting that the Appeals 
Chamber for the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Yugoslavia held in the Tadić 
case that “[a]lthough only some members 
of the group may physically perpetrate 
the criminal act (murder, extermination, 
wanton destruction of cities, towns or 
villages, etc.), the participation and 
contribution of the other members of 
the group is often vital in facilitating 
the commission of the offence in ques-
tion.” Indeed, according to Judge Pocar, 
planning a crime involves “designing the 
criminal conduct” constituting the statu-
tory crimes “that are later perpetrated.” 
Thus, in his opinion, planning a crime 
may amount to a significant contribution 
to the execution of a common purpose.
Ultimately, having rejected the 
majority of appeals from both the pros-
ecution and the defense, the Appeals 
Chamber affirmed Trial Chamber II’s 
conviction of Kanyarukiga for planning 
genocide and extermination as a crime 
against humanity, as well as his thirty-
year sentence of imprisonment.
Martha Branigan-Sutton, an L.L.M. 
candidate at the American University 
Washington College of Law, wrote this 
summary for the Human Rights Brief. 
Katherine Cleary Thompson, Assistant 
Director of the War Crimes Research 
Office, edited this summary for the 
Human Rights Brief.
Aloys NtAbAkuze v. the 
Prosecutor, APPeAls JudgmeNt, 
cAse No. Ictr-98-41A-A
On May 8, 2012, the Appeals Chamber 
of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR) issued a decision 
on the appeal of Aloys Ntabakuze, the 
Commander of the Para-Commando 
Battalion of the Rwandan Army. Trial 
Chamber I had convicted Ntabakuze 
based on its findings that he bore 
superior responsibility for a number of 
crimes and sentenced him to life impris-
onment. Specifically, the lower court 
convicted the accused of genocide; the 
crimes against humanity of extermination, 
persecution, murder, and other inhumane 
acts; and violence to life as a serious 
violation of the Geneva Convention and 
its Additional Protocol II, as incorporated 
into the ICTR statute. The convictions 
were based on three different incidents 
that occurred in April 1994: (i) the killing 
of Tutsis in the Kabeza area of Kigali on 
April 7–8; (ii) the killing of Tutsis on 
Nyanza Hill on April 11; and (iii) the 
killing of Tutsis at the Institut Africain et 
Mauricien de Statistiques et d’Économie 
Appliquée (IAMSEA) in the Remera area 
of Kigali on April 15. On appeal, the 
Appeals Chamber unanimously reversed 
Ntabakuze’s conviction for other inhu-
mane acts as a crime against humanity 
based on the events at Nyanza Hill, and 
a majority of the Chamber reversed his 
convictions for genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes in relation to 
the killings in Kabeza. Based on these 
holdings, the Appeals Chamber vacated 
Ntabakuze’s life sentence, replacing it 
with a term of 35 years’ imprisonment.
Ntabakuze appealed his conviction on 
37 grounds. Notably, Ntabakuze claimed 
that his rights to a fair trial had been 
violated in a number of ways, including 
the prosecution’s failure to properly 
inform him of the charges against him 
until the end of trial and the prosecution’s 
failure to observe disclosure obligations. 
He also claims that in convicting him, 
the Trial Chamber “relied solely on 
unreasonable and hypothetical inferences 
in violation of the principle of inno-
cence.” However, the Appeals Chamber 
dismissed each of these claims, finding 
that the defense was not able to substanti-
ate any of them.
Ntabakuze also claimed that his right 
to be tried without undue delay had 
been violated, stressing that he had been 
detained twelve years by the time he filed 
his Notice of Appeal. In response, the 
Appeals Chamber recognized the “sub-
stantial length of the proceedings in the 
case,” but noted that the Trial Chamber 
had already rejected the defense’s claim 
that his right to a speedy trial had been 
violated in light of the “size and com-
plexity of the trial.” According to the 
Appeals Chamber, the mere length of 
the accused’s detention did not show that 
the Trial Chamber erred in reaching this 
conclusion.
Another set of challenges brought 
by the defense involved challenges to 
the indictment. Specifically, Ntabakuze 
alleged that the prosecution erred in not 
putting him on notice regarding material 
facts underpinning the charges against 
him or regarding the mode of liability 
upon which the prosecution based its 
case. Before turning to the particulars 
of these claims, the Appeals Chamber 
recalled that “the charges against an 
accused and the material facts supporting 
those charges must be pleaded with suf-
ficient precision in an indictment so as to 
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provide notice to the accused,” and that 
whether a fact is “material” depends “on 
the nature of the [p]rosecution’s case.” 
The Chamber also noted that a defective 
indictment may be “cured” if “the [p]ros-
ecution provides the accused with timely, 
clear, and consistent information detail-
ing the factual basis underpinning the 
charge.” Turning to the defense’s specific 
claims, the Chamber found that although 
the indictment was in fact defective with 
respect to the charge that the accused 
bore superior responsibility for kill-
ings committed in the town of Kabeza, 
the prosecution had cured the defect 
through information submitted in its Pre-
Trial Brief and the Supplement thereto. 
However, the Appeals Chamber also 
found that the indictment failed to inform 
Ntabakuze that the prosecutor was charg-
ing him as a superior for the crime against 
humanity of other inhumane acts based 
on his role of preventing refugees who 
were killed at Nyanza Hill from seeking 
sanctuary before being taken to the hill. 
Furthermore, it found that the prosecu-
tion did not cure this defect by presenting 
appropriate information regarding this 
charge in subsequent filings, and that the 
prosecution failed to prove that this lack 
of information did not prevent Ntabakuze 
from preparing an adequate defense to 
the charge. Accordingly, the Appeals 
Chamber vacated the lower court’s 
conviction of Ntabakuze for the crime 
against humanity of other inhumane 
acts. The Appeals Chamber also found 
that, although the prosecution gener-
ally provided the accused with sufficient 
notice that he was being charged under 
a theory of superior responsibility for 
the actions of Para-Commando soldiers 
who belonged to the battalion led by 
Ntabakuze, the prosecution failed to suf-
ficiently allege that he was responsible 
for the acts of certain militiamen who 
committed acts alongside these soldiers. 
Thus, the Appeals Chamber reversed the 
Trial Chamber’s findings to the extent 
they relied on the actions of militiamen, 
although this holding did not wholly 
vacate any of the convictions because 
each of the charges for which the accused 
was convicted were supported by mul-
tiple allegations.
In addition to successfully challenging 
certain aspects of the prosecution’s charg-
ing strategy, the defense convinced a 
majority of the Appeals Chamber that the 
Trial Chamber erred in concluding that 
Ntabakuze bore superior responsibility 
for the killings carried out by soldiers at 
Kabeza. Specifically, while the major-
ity found that the Trial Chamber acted 
within its discretion in concluding that 
the killings were carried out by mem-
bers of the Para-Commando Battalion, 
it was not satisfied that the lower court 
adequately addressed evidence put 
forward by the defense suggesting that 
certain members of the Battalion were 
serving under a commander other than 
Ntabakuze. Because it was not clear from 
the evidence which company of the bat-
talion carried out the relevant attacks, the 
majority of the Appeals Chamber vacated 
the Trial Chamber’s convictions to the 
extent they were based on actions carried 
out at Kabeza. In a dissenting opinion, 
Judges Pocar and Liu explained that they 
were satisfied with the Trial Chamber’s 
assessment of the evidence that led it 
to conclude Ntabakuze exercised effec-
tive control over the perpetrators of the 
attacks in Kabeza, that the defendant 
knew that the attacks would be taking 
place, and that he failed to prevent them.
Finally, the Appeals Chamber 
dismissed each of the defense’s chal-
lenges to the Trial Chamber’s approach 
to sentencing, a claim which had asserted 
that the lower court erred (i) by choosing 
a single sentence based upon multiple 
convictions for the same acts; (ii) by 
“double-counting” the accused’s role 
as a superior both in determining his 
responsibility for the crimes and as an 
aggravating factor, as well as the number 
of victims at Nyanza Hill in considering 
the gravity of the accused’s crimes and 
as an aggravating factor; and (iii) by 
abusing its discretion by imposing a 
life sentence. With regard to the first 
claim, the Appeals Chamber stressed 
that the “primary goal in sentencing 
is to ensure that the final or aggregate 
sentence reflects the totality of the crimi-
nal conduct and overall culpability of 
the offender,” and it held that there was 
nothing suggesting that the Trial Chamber 
had not adduced its sentence according to 
these principles. In relation to the second 
claim, the Appeals Chamber disagreed 
with the defense’s assessment that the 
Trial Chamber had “double-counted” the 
relevant factors, noting that the mere 
discussion of these factors in its assess-
ment of the sentence does not mean they 
were relied upon by the Chamber more 
than once. Lastly, the Appeals Chamber 
held that, based on its holdings at trial, 
the lower court acted within its discretion 
to impose a life sentence, despite the 
fact that the defense offered a number 
of mitigating factors and even though 
Ntabakuze was convicted on the basis of 
superior responsibility rather than direct 
perpetration. Nevertheless, given the fact 
that the majority of the Appeals Chamber 
vacated a number of the Trial Chamber’s 
convictions, as discussed above, it 
reduced Ntabakuze’s sentence from life 
imprisonment to a term of 35 years.
Jacilyn Fortini, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, wrote this summary for the 
Human Rights Brief. Katherine Cleary 
Thompson, Assistant Director of the War 
Crimes Research Office, edited this sum-
mary for the Human Rights Brief.
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